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This article uses data drawn from Southeast Asia and West Africa to help explain the geographical distribution of 
foreign investment.  Why during late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century globalization did the attributes of 
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World not similarly draw capital to the tropics?  I argue that in a number of tropical countries, rich natural resources 
and cheap labour available through mass migration effectively substituted for foreign borrowing.  At the same time, 
the dominant institution of colonialism throughout Southeast Asia and West Africa limited borrowing from abroad 
and helped to ensure that even for these resource-rich countries capital flows remained slight. 
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Globalization, Natural Resources, Foreign Investment: A View from the Resource-Rich 
Tropics 
 
1.  Introduction 
The geographical distribution of foreign investment associated with late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century globalization was strikingly uneven.  Between 1865 and 1914 three fifths of 
British, and two thirds of trans-European, foreign investment went to regions of recent European 
settlement, or the New World, with only a tenth of global population; just over a quarter of 
capital went to Asia and Africa where two thirds of people lived (Edelstein, 1982, p. 40; Stone, 
1999, pp. 23, 414).  A long tradition beginning with Alfred Marshall (1920, p. 668) and 
encompassing Nurkse (1959, p.17-18) stresses natural resources and large inward migration as 
key explanatory factors in disproportionate foreign investment in the New World.  Clemens and 
Williamson (2004, pp. 304, 333), widening the geographical range of this tradition, contrast the 
New World with 'labour-abundant Asia and Africa'.  Capital did not, they explain, go to these 
'poor, labour abundant economies.  We call this the wealth bias'.  Wealth in New World 
countries took a number of forms but, in particular, capital was 'chasing natural resources, 
educated populations, migrants, and young, urban populations'. 
  Why then between the 1870s and Second World War did rapidly expanding tropical 
areas in Asia and Africa receive little foreign investment despite having the rich natural 
resources and heavy inward migration identified as fundamental to explaining capital inflows to 
the New World?  The main aim of this article is to try to answer that question by analyzing the 
economic development of eight swiftly growing, natural resource rich countries.  Six are in 
Southeast Asia, namely Burma, Indochina, Thailand (Siam), Malaya, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines.  The other two, Ghana (the Gold Coast) and Nigeria, are situated in coastal West 
Africa.  A lack of data prevented Clemens and Williamson (2004) from including two of the 
Southeast Asia countries considered here, Malaya and Indochina, or any country in Africa, and   2
from continuing their study beyond 1914.  The present article fills some of these gaps.  It 
extends analysis into the interwar years and contributes to an understanding of globalization and 
post-1870 foreign investment by studying in comparative historical depth eight tropical 
countries of a particular type. 
  These countries provide the basis for a vent-for-surplus growth model developed by 
Myint (1958) and Findlay (1970, 1995) and recently elaborated by Kelly (1997).  The model is 
appropriate to countries which, as part of globalization from the 1870s onwards, experienced 
rapid export expansion based on rich natural resources without alternative domestic use.  Natural 
resources, in combination with cheap labour, could be transformed into exports with only 
minimal foreign investment (Drake, 1972; Findlay and Lundahl, 1994, 2001).  Vent-for-surplus 
areas in the eight Southeast Asian and West African countries, although typically labour-scarce, 
could call on a large supply of labour willing to work for not much above a subsistence wage.  
Labour supply was through international immigration and internal migration.  In the New 
World, capital and natural resources combined as complements to fuel rapid export growth.  I 
argue that in the eight Asian and African countries export expansion was similarly rapid, but 
relied on natural resources and nearby cheap labour.  Capital flowed to the New World because 
it 'went where it was most profitable' (Clemens and Williamson, 2004, p. 333).  By contrast, a 
similar profitability did not obtain in the eight resource-rich Asia and Africa because in the 
production of export commodities, natural resources and labour were efficient substitutes for 
foreign capital.  As part of the openness associated with late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century globalization, colonial governments did not, contrary to Lucas' (1990, p. 95) hypothesis, 
try to restrict investment to maximize rents.   Metropolitan capital could have flowed to colonial 
Southeast Asia and West Africa in response to rich resources had this been profitable. 
  The article argues that there were two further, complementary reasons for restricted 
foreign investment in these resource-rich Asian and African countries, one geographical the   3
                                                
other institutional.  Both have as a starting point the importance of social overhead projects, 
notably railways, and government borrowing in international capital flows before the Second 
World War.  First, unlike in much of the New World, a geography which facilitated water 
transport, especially in the Asian countries here considered, reduced pressure on governments to 
make a financial commitment to railways in the late nineteenth century, at a time when railways 
constituted the most important component of international investment.  Second, the institution of 
colonialism and its associated preferences for light taxation and if possible small surpluses, or at 
least balanced budgets, severely circumscribed fiscal capacity.  As a consequence, government 
borrowing for investment in social overhead projects was limited. 
2.  Geography, export expansion and government 
2.1 Geographical realities 
In the 1860s large parts of the tropics, notably in Southeast Asia and West Africa, were sparsely 
populated or even uninhabited.
1  Often the most natural resource rich areas within the eight 
countries were also the least settled because they were unattractive for settlement prior to a 
demand for the products that could be produced there.  Globalization, since this new demand 
was an integral part of it, helped to define resource abundance.  Tropical populations had no 
reason to migrate from traditional subsistence agriculture to pioneer frontier areas and engage in 
what quickly became monoculture until late nineteenth-century transport and communication 
developments linked the tropics to a world market.  But once this linkage allowed international 
trade to provide an outlet, or 'vent', for the products in which resource abundant tropical regions 
had a comparative advantage, large-scale inward migration swiftly followed. 
2.2 Migration and moving frontiers 
 
1 Principal Southeast Asian exceptions to this in the eight countries considered were dense populations in Java (but 
not Indonesia's Outer Islands), north Vietnam in Indochina, and central Luzon in the Philippines.  Close settlement 
also existed in a few districts of eastern Nigeria and in the north around Kano.   4
Along with resource abundance, two striking aspects of rapid tropical development between 
1870 and the Second World War were mass migration, both within and across national 
boundaries, and the nearly identical technologies shared by small farmers, or 'peasants', and 
plantations.  Both relied on traditional agricultural tools.  In all of the tropics, only sugar, tea and 
oil palm were predominately plantation crops.  Other tropical exports depended substantially, or 
even exclusively, on the enterprise of small farmers.  Nor did mining necessarily require a 
departure from small-scale traditional techniques if mineral deposits were sufficiently rich and 
alluvial. 
  Dual economies developed in the tropics in conjunction with the new vent-for-surplus 
trade opportunities, and often a country's traditional sector largely supplied the migrants to work 
in the export sector.  One of the 'great events' in recent African economic history began in 1892 
in Ghana when migrants moved west from the Akwapim scarp to north-western Akwapim, and 
after 1900 to the practically uninhabited dense forests and swamps of southern Akim Abuakwa, 
to create, by 1911, the world's principal cocoa industry.  Ghanaian migrants cleared the land 
themselves and built their own roads and bridges, relying on European merchants in Accra and 
other port cities only as a link to world markets (Hill, 1963, pp. 163-88).  During the inter-war 
years Ghana's cocoa industry, now drawing migrants from other West African countries, more 
than doubled in size (Szereszewski, 1965, pp. 57-58).  It accounted for 44% of world cocoa 
exports in 1926-30 (United Kingdom, 1938, p. 186).  In Nigeria rapid growth in agricultural 
exports, including cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil, came from small farms.  Apart from offering 
these farmers 'a vent for their potential surplus production the foreigner [merchants and 
government] did next to nothing to alter the technological backwardness of the economy' 
(Helleiner, 1966, p. 12). 
  In Southeast Asia, like Ghana and Nigeria, export expansion was characterized by 
settlement of a moving frontier (Findlay, 1995).  During the late nineteenth century Vietnam,   5
Burma and Thailand emerged as the world's three great rice exporters.  In Vietnam production 
centred in the six southern provinces of Cochinchina, or Nam Bo, and especially the Mein Tay 
region.  Its resemblance to 'all the world's great deltas in that the boundaries between water and 
land are often indistinct' had previously discouraged settlement and rice cultivation depended on 
an incessant flow of migrants from Nam Bo's central and eastern provinces (Brocheux, 1995, pp. 
2-58).  Export-led growth in the Philippines, which became the world's largest sugar exporter 
after Cuba, relied substantially on migration from densely populated coastal areas and Luzon's 
crowded centre.  Until the 1920s, development in the Philippines' western Negros wilderness 
'shared much in common with the global frontier phenomenon' (Larkin, 1993, p.60).  Similarly, 
Javanese migrants were important to the post-1870 transformation of the Outer Islands into the 
dynamic part of Indonesia's economy. 
 Export  expansion  combined with Southeast Asia's particular geography near India and 
China to give rise to mass immigration.  Between 1881 and 1939 over 15 million Chinese and 
Indian immigrants came to Burma, Malaya and Thailand, more than these three countries’ total 
1881 population (Huff and Caggiano, 2007).  In the process of Asian globalization, China and 
India became 'hinterlands' of surplus labour sending workers to a 'centre' of land-surplus 
Southeast Asia where, in turn, economies were driven by new opportunities for international 
trade. 
  Internal migration was also important in the growth of both the Burmese and Thai rice 
economies.  The rise of rice production in Lower (or southern) Burma crisscrossed by the 
Irrawaddy and its tributaries was particularly dramatic.  After 1850 the availability of global 
markets led to the migration, at its height a 'rice rush', to the Irrawaddy Delta of peasants from 
Upper Burma.  By 1930 10 million acres of swamp had been cleared and planted with rice 
through 'the sustained effort of millions of peasants working only with bullocks or buffaloes and 
the simple, locally-made ploughs and implements they had evolved in their own way over the   6
centuries' (Dobby, 1966, p. 173).  Thailand's rice frontier, which boomed in the 1890s and 
1900s, was reminiscent of the United States' wild west but lay geographically to the south where 
'in every direction the land was cleared of the heavy jungle grass which afforded shelter to wild 
elephants' (Johnston, 1981, p. 111).  In the 1870s Malaya was sparsely populated, largely 
unmapped and 'land was so abundant and readily available that it had no value' (Gullick, 1985, 
p.59).  Chinese and Indian immigration furnished most of the labour that made Malaya the 
world's main supplier of both tin and rubber. 
2.3 Production functions, self-financing development and development paths 
None of the eight Southeast Asian and West African countries had much manufacturing; all 
depended on exporting just one or two primary commodities.  Export staples included rubber, 
tin, rice, sugar and cocoa.  Of these, the production functions of only sugar, plantation rubber 
and tin involved sizeable amounts of capital and more than a few, if any, skilled workers. 
Moreover, until at least the early part of the twentieth century in the vent-for-surplus 
sectors of all eight tropical economies small, highly labour intensive production units were the 
rule.  The Philippines moved more slowly to centralized, capital-intensive processing of sugar 
than any of the world's other main producers.  Consequently, until after the end of the Spanish 
period (effectively 1900) in the Philippines sugar 'still was a matter of small landholdings, small 
mills, primitive methods, and fairly widespread participation in the fruits of production and 
export' (Spencer, 1954, p. 203).  In 1903 in Malaya, the exploitation of rich alluvial tin deposits 
yielded 51,000 tons of the metal, over half of world output.  Production depended on some 
224,000 miners, virtually all Chinese and equipped with little more than shovels and simple 
pumps.  Substantial capital expenditure in Malayan tin mining awaited the exhaustion of easily 
won tin deposits and this, and the consequent growing importance of European mines, began 
only after 1910.  The Malayan and Indonesian rubber industries were still in their infancy before   7
World War I.  During the interwar period, rubber acreage in both Malaya and Indonesia divided 
about equally between plantations and smallholders. 
Apart from interwar Philippines sugar and Malayan tin, in the eight countries' staple 
industries neither economies of scale nor capital were significant issues.  The dominant, and 
until after about 1910 almost the sole, production function for export staples in the eight tropical 
economies utilized abundant land and more or less unlimited cheap, unskilled labour.  Technical 
change was minimal; expansion was almost entirely through increased land and labour inputs.  
Small parcels of land were freely available to those willing to settle them.  In the eight countries, 
colonial land policy, as opposed to economic or technical advantages, could have made large-
scale production the mode.  As a rule, however, governments favoured small production units, 
encapsulated in a colonial rhetoric of the nobility of peasant cultivators or, in the Philippines, the 
ideal of the yeoman farmer (Hailey, 1938, pp. 768-80, 868, 1649; Larkin, 1993, p. 68). 
Labour to produce vent-for-surplus exports came from the traditional sector of dual 
economies or through international immigration at no more than the marginal product of 
subsistence agriculture (the opportunity cost of labour) plus some mark up to cover migration 
costs.  Between the opening of large-scale international trade and the Second World War, in 
both Southeast Asia and West Africa long-term unskilled wages (real income) in the export 
sector remained more or less constant at about a shilling a day (Szereszewski, 1965, pp. 57-58, 
138; Birmingham, 1960, p. 2; Helleiner, 1964, p. 231; Austin, 2005, p. 320; Runes, 1939, pp. 
10-11, 31; Hlaing, 1964b, pp. 120-21; Feeny, 1982, pp. 18, 21, 132-33; Huff and Caggiano, 
2007).  By contrast, the New World took its wage level not from subsistence agriculture but 
from the opportunity cost of much higher real incomes in the cities and industrial areas of 
Europe. 
The production functions of vent-for-surplus economies like the eight in Southeast Asia 
and West Africa have typically been modeled with no separate capital constraint, since only   8
simple tools and seeds are needed (Myint, 1958 and see the formal models of Helleiner, 1966, 
pp. 10-12 and Findlay, 1970, pp. 70-76).  Over a large range of production and for a 
considerable time, the ready availability of good quality land avoids diminishing returns as 
migrants push outwards the country's frontier.  Furthermore, even when frontier land is no 
longer of the best quality it remains abundant and surplus to purely domestic economy 
requirements.  Although in Burma good land was gone by 1900, it existed in Thailand and 
Malaya in the interwar years.  Most of Sumatra and Borneo had, Bauer observed in 1948 (p. 69), 
‘almost unlimited land available’.  The opportunity that foreign markets afforded to exploit 
underutilized resources set in train a process that, as Myint (1987, p. 121) stressed, stretched 
over ‘many decades’. 
 In  the  Myint/Helleiner/Findlay models, the traditional (pre-vent-for-surplus trade) level 
of consumption is achieved with less than possible labour inputs.  Potential output is ‘lost’ in 
preference to leisure.  But the new, improved the new, improved terms of trade at which, with 
globalization and the opening of trade, Asian and African primary producers can now exchange 
their output for consumer goods (the newly available imports or ‘inducement goods’) raises the 
opportunity cost of leisure and so creates an incentive for greater labour inputs.  In the eight 
tropical economies, that incentive proved catalytic because, as was remarked of Nigeria, 'the 
price of cocoa affords the only stimulus necessary to cultivation' (Stamp, 1938, p. 40).  
Expansion onto new land combined with mobilizable man hours of labour and more workers, 
added largely through domestic or international migration, led to rapid rises in output and 
transformed the Southeast Asian and West African countries into export economies. 
Because the eight tropical countries could draw on a highly elastic supply of frontier 
land and large amounts of cheap labour, export expansion was largely self-financing.  Much of 
initial investment by small farmers and miners consisted of their own and family labour time.  
Necessary finance to buy seeds and simple tools to clear land came from personal savings or   9
borrowing from traders, local shopkeepers and others.  Once production was underway, the main 
need was for circulating capital or produced inputs (as opposed to fixed or durable inputs) which 
are used up in one period of production and include 'wage fund' advances paid to workers at the 
outset of the production cycle.  The cycle was typically short — under a year for crops like rice 
and cocoa and even less for tin mining in Malaya.  Finance was self-sustaining.  Principal 
recouped and profits from one cycle provided finance for the next and, moreover, new capital to 
extend the export production frontier, so long as the rent created by clearing new land at least 
equaled the interest cost of the wage fund (Drake, 1972, 2004; Findlay and Lundahl, 2001).  
Investment was likely to be productive since, as Bauer (2000, pp. 12-13) emphasizes, it was 
made by people with a direct interest in the returns and who, furthermore, supervised their own 
work effort. 
Plantation agriculture, by contrast, required large amounts of capital to produce an 
identical crop to that of small farmers.  Finance was necessary, not because of any difference in 
agricultural tools, but to feed and supervise a labour force while clearing land, planting crops, 
waiting several years (five for cocoa and seven for rubber) for them to bear, and then 
maintaining an estate and marketing its output.  In Ghana, Ashanti family farms could establish 
an acre of cocoa for about a third of the cost of plantations (Ingham, 1981, p. 41).  Smallholders 
in Malaya and Indonesia with less than 15 acres brought rubber into bearing for as little as a 
twelfth of the capital outlay required to open a European estate (Figart, 1925; Bauer, 1948, pp. 
67-68). 
A developmental problem for all vent-for-surplus economies is to move from production 
functions heavily dependent on more inputs of land and unskilled labour to self-sustaining 
economic growth.  In the absence of substantial technological change but continued population 
growth and the end of surplus land, Lewis-Fei-Ranis surplus labour becomes evident.  Unless   10
the economy implements land-saving technical progress in the production of food, it must 
somehow produce manufactures locally to absorb productively the increase in population. 
In the eight tropical economies the dominant development path, insofar as it was 
determined by production functions, was one of small, often family, economic units, and so 
more like America’s nineteenth-century Midwest than the cotton and sugar-producing southern 
United States.  Major developmental differences from the Midwest existed, however.  These 
included an effectively limitless supply of cheap labour in the eight countries, the institution of 
colonial government, restricted infrastructure, minimal financial development, and no strong 
educational tradition. 
2.4 Foreign investment patterns and investor requirements 
There were two main reasons why in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries substantial 
international investment might have gone to the tropics.  One was the exploitation of natural 
resources to produce commodities demanded by world markets.  The other was lending for 
social overhead projects such as plant and equipment for railways, tramways, docks, 
telecommunications, and gas, electric and water works.  In the years 1865 to 1914, social 
overhead investment, of which railways made up three fifths of the total, accounted for 61.8% of 
new issues raised on British stock exchanges.  Investment flows from other major nineteenth-
century capital exporters followed the same pattern as Britain (Edelstein, 1982, pp. 37-38). 
Social overhead projects tend to be lumpy and before the Second World War their size 
relative to the saving pool of local capital markets outside of London, other European centres 
and after 1914 the United States often necessitated finance from long distance and foreign 
savers.  They, in turn, usually demanded the involvement of government in the borrowing 
countries: 'the organizing and taxing power of governments, backed by [a] monopoly of 
violence, was necessary to impress the required mass of overseas investors' (Edelstein, 1982, p. 
38).  Between 1865 and 1914 government and mixed government-private enterprise took 65%   11
of British social overhead capital issues.  And from 1918 to 1931 lending to public authorities 
accounted for 69% of British overseas investment (Atkin, 1977, pp. 130-31). 
In Argentina, the region of recent settlement most comparable to the eight tropical 
countries in its level of financial development, the embryonic nature and thinness of domestic 
financial markets necessitated foreign investment and left government chiefly to organize this 
(Davis and Gallman, 2001, pp. 721-22).  Likewise, in Southeast Asia and West Africa local 
capital markets lacked organization and depth.  Railway construction and social overhead 
projects largely devolved to governments.  Insofar as foreign investors, typically through joint 
stock companies, came forward, they almost invariably dealt through Southeast Asian and West 
African governments and required, as for example with railway construction in Burma, heavy 
government finance and/or interest guarantees on investment (Shein, 1964, pp. 44-53). 
2.5 Geography and railways 
During the seven decades before the Second World War, however, governments in the eight 
Southeast Asian and West African countries, although assuming the responsibility for social 
overhead projects, borrowed sparingly for this purpose.  Above all, attitudes towards borrowing 
reflected the fiscal and monetary policies of colonial government.  However, especially in the 
early stages of development until around 1905, a combination of geography and cheap labour 
also made low government borrowing compatible with a level of economic development judged 
to be satisfactory. 
Between 1865 and 1914 railway expansion absorbed 42% of British capital exports 
(Stone, 1999, p.10).  Geographical considerations significantly influenced the distribution of this 
investment.  Where water routes were difficult or infeasible and labour costs high railways soon 
became essential as the only serious alternative to human or wagon transport.  Diaz Alejandro 
(1970, p. 45) emphasizes this point for Argentina's large pampean zone, as does Harley (2000, 
pp. 930-3) for the Canadian prairies and Summerhill (2005) for Brazil.   12
Conversely, in Southeast Asia and West Africa a more favourable geography than usual 
in regions of recent settlement made it possible for late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
governments to resist a large commitment to railway investment and yet for these eight countries 
still to achieve rapid export expansion.  'It is a mistake', Hopkins (1973, p. 198) reminds us of 
West Africa, 'to think of modern transport as creating an export economy out of nothing'.  In 
both Southeast Asia and West Africa successful export economies could precede the spread of 
railways.  Fundamental features in Southeast Asia were its maritime character, together with the 
region's many rivers and high rainfall.  The spread of cultivation in some areas required initial 
lumpy investment in infrastructure, as in the construction of a network of canals in Cochinchina 
to drain the land, and in Thailand, where canals helped to distribute floodwater.  But these new 
waterways also afforded a cheap means of internal transport.  Coastal, riverine or island shipping 
fulfilled a similar role elsewhere in Southeast Asia.  The Irrawaddy is navigable 900 miles into 
Burma, and another of Asia's great rivers, the Mekong, facilitated water transport in Indochina.  
In the Philippines the seas of Sibuyan, Visayan and Mindanao provided sheltered domestic 
waterways.  Malaya's peninsular shape allowed the use of short, feeder railway lines as a 
complement to coastal shipping. 
West Africa was less well favoured with opportunities for water transport than Southeast 
Asia and this made labour costs more critical.  After observing that 'a developed infrastructure 
was not a precondition for the emergence of the major cash crops of Southeast Asia and West 
Africa', Bauer (1984, p. 30) explains that human and animal transport and long chains of 
commercial intermediaries were 'partial but effective substitutes' for expensive communication 
systems.  Ghana's cocoa industry could at first develop without too much social overhead 
investment because the initial exporting region was near the coast and cheap labour made head 
porterage economical for up to fifty miles (Holmes, 1970, pp. 164-65; Ingham, 1981, pp. 34, 
95).  As late as 1905 just 12% of Ghana's cocoa exports were taken to sea by railway (Kay,   13
1972, p. 20).  Railways were, however, needed for the inter-war spread of Ghana's cocoa 
industry (Austin, 2005, pp. 68, 78) and for the development of a northern Nigerian export 
economy (Helleiner, 1966, p. 14).  In inter-war Southeast Asia, governments hitherto able to 
avoid railway construction could then limit it due to the growth of motorized transport.   
2.6 Colonial financial orthodoxy 
By the early twentieth century, export expansion in the eight Southeast Asian and West African 
countries had created resources large enough to permit substantial overseas borrowing to further 
economic development.  Nevertheless, foreign investment remained limited.  A principal 
argument of this article is that institutions matter.  Colonial government preferences for minimal 
borrowing and strict fiscal orthodoxy emerged as an important explanation for slight capital 
flows to the eight resource-rich Southeast Asian and West African countries.  Of the eight, 
Thailand was the exception in having formal political independence.  But its government relied 
on a British financial advisor and closely followed the colonial pattern of low taxation, balanced 
budgets, a desire to pay for development spending from current revenues, and an avoidance of 
foreign debt if possible.  As late as 1904 Thailand had never borrowed internationally but 
between 1905 and 1909 contracted three relatively small sterling loans (Ingram, 1971, pp. 181-
87).  Subsequent borrowing was slight, sporadic and much of it further added to an already 
strong foreign reserve position; 'London bankers would have been only too glad to give new 
loans [and] offers were made, but not accepted' (Callis, 1942, p. 60).  Malaya, with the highest 
per capita exports in the world, could easily have borrowed substantial sums in Britain but, in 
fact, made little recourse to the London market.  The Federated Malay States government paid 
largely from current revenue and treasury surpluses for a 1,719 kilometer railway completed in 
1931 for all of the Peninsula and Singapore at a cost of £33 million (Callis, 1942, p. 50). 
  Before the Second World War the norm was, as in Nigeria, to conduct government 
finance according to the 'orthodox and prudent tenets of British Colonial fiscal policy'   14
(Helleiner, 1966, p. 232; see also Hopkins, 1973, pp. 198, 260).  To be sure, not all of the eight 
tropical countries strictly conformed to this colonial ideal and some, mainly non-British 
possessions, did not always wish to do so.  Indochina had periods of significant government 
borrowing in the decade after 1900 and again in the 1930s.  In Southeast Asia, Indonesia was 
exceptional in governmental willingness to contract debt.  But Indonesian surpluses accumulated 
between 1921 and 1939 far outweighed a pre-1921 deficit.  Government spending in the Dutch 
colony never strayed too far or for too long from a balanced budget (Dick, et al., 2002, p. 123). 
3.  Empirical analysis 
For a significant component of the tropics represented by the eight Southeast Asian and West 
African countries, globalization between 1870 and the Second World War had three prominent 
features.  First, export expansion was as swift as anywhere, including the regions of recent 
European settlement.  In the New World and tropics alike, rapid agricultural growth depended 
mainly on the natural resource of empty wet land; growth was fastest, Lewis (1970, p. 28) 
explained, 'in areas with new land and immigrant labour' or 'areas with access to new land plus 
surplus labour time'.  Second, in the eight tropical countries, unlike the regions of recent 
settlement, expansion typically took place with at best limited foreign investment.  Third, 
colonial rule in the tropics tightly constrained government borrowing. 
  Time series foreign investment data, which Clemens and Williamson (2004) use, exist 
only for capital flows from the United Kingdom and only until 1914.  But African expansion 
had hardly started in 1900 and, like growth in Southeast Asia, continued through the 1920s.  The 
present section therefore extends analysis through the inter-war years and uses a variety of 
quantitative material to support empirically two of this article's main points.  To summarise, 
these are: that in a particular group of tropical countries abundant natural resources allowed 
rapid export expansion with only small amounts of foreign capital; and that although in these   15
                                                
countries successful export economies would have permitted bigger capital inflows, colonial 
government precluded any such development. 
3.1 Per capita exports and foreign investment 
Table 1 compares per capita exports and foreign investment in tropical and temperate, or New 
World, regions and has two main features.  One is rapid export growth in both groups of 
countries.  The other is a sharp divergence between capital inflows: they were large to the New 
World and minimal in the tropics.  Per capita exports from the tropics were, however, 
substantially less than from the New World when averaged to include the subsistence sectors of 
dual economies.  Yet if Southeast Asian and West African export sectors could be isolated to 
correspond to national boundaries, tropical per capita exports would be as great as or greater 
than from the New World.  Malaya, still little populated in 1870, is the country most susceptible 
to this isolation, since migration from Southeastern China and Madras largely substituted for the 
traditional, labour-providing sectors present in the other seven tropical economies. 
  In Malaya, some European capital was invested to develop rubber estates (in 1932 
European estate acreage was four fifths that of Asian small farmers) and after about 1910 to 
mine tin, but even so, unlike in the New World, per capita exports dwarfed foreign investment.  
As late as 1913 in Malaya, as throughout Southeast Asia and West Africa, rapid export 
expansion had occurred with minimal foreign investment.  Taking the ratio of per capita exports 
to per capita foreign investment as a measure, in 1911/13 this export- investment ratio averaged 
3.2 in the New World compared to 10.7 in the tropics.  By 1925/27 the difference in ratios, 3.5 
for the New World and 12.8 in the tropics, had appreciably increased.  In the inter-war period, 
though per capita exports continued to expand as more land was brought under cultivation, 
foreign investment in Southeast Asia and West Africa remained far down world league tables.
2
 
2 The argument that in a particular group of tropical countries foreign investment was not a precondition for export 
growth might normally be tested by using Granger causality to help establish precedence.  A Granger test is, 
however, precluded by the nature of the data.  Between 1865 and 1914 for the four of eight tropical countries for   16
                                                                                                                                                       
3.2 Cheap labour and economic efficiency 
The international trade literature on the Leontief Paradox shows that natural resources and 
capital may be either complements or substitutes (Naya, 1967, pp. 567, 570).  If, as for exports 
in Southeast Asia and West Africa, the elasticity of substitution between labour and natural 
resources on the one hand and foreign capital on the other is quite high and the implicit wage of 
peasants at best low, labour-intensive production is likely to offer the economically least cost 
solution as well as a technically efficient one.  So it proved in Southeast Asia and West Africa 
before the Second World War.  When capital- and managerial-intensive European undertakings 
competed with small Asian or African enterprise the latter almost always proved the more 
economically viable.  Such tropical efficiency rendered foreign investment to finance capital 
intensive raw material production (if not necessarily complementary infrastructure) largely 
redundant.  There was no reason for capital to flow to export industries in Southeast Asia and 
West Africa if it could not profitably be employed there. 
  When in the late nineteenth century world demand for tin increased sharply (due mainly 
to the innovation of tinned food), European companies responded by raising capital in Britain 
and repeatedly tried to establish Malayan mining ventures.  They were, however, unable to 
compete with Chinese miners until after 1910, when a depletion of rich alluvial deposits gave 
scope for costly mining equipment.  Before then, according to the tin industry's historian, 
Europeans failed to appreciate that 'technological efficiency was not synonymous with economy, 
and that the conditions of the tin deposits favoured small scale mining by simple labour-
intensive technique' (Wong, 1965, p. 153).  The great deltaic rice-growing regions of Southeast 
Asia had the natural resource of soil so fertile that it 'has long been marveled at' (Coclanis, 1993, 
 
which annual foreign investment data are available the Clemens and Williamson (2004) data set show just 63 
instances of positive (non zero) investment out of a total of 200 observations.  Among the sporadic and occasional 
appearance of capital inflows, the 137 observations of zero foreign investment blanket the tropical data for long 
periods.  Such an investment distribution violates the Granger requirements that data be made stationary by log 
differences or other means and that series have only one variance. 
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p. 1065).  Combined with cheap labour, this gave the region's farmers a clear edge over United 
States' rice production.  Coclanis and Komlos (1987) show that in Burma's late nineteenth 
century rice industry, efficiency, measured as total factor productivity, equalled that in the 
American south.  In the interwar United States, large-scale rice production, labour saving 
devices and efficient milling were insufficient to overcome high American wages and create the 
competitive strength to challenge Southeast Asian producers in world export markets (Cole, 
1927).  Similarly, apart from Africa's oil palm industry where expensive centralised processing 
gave an edge to plantations, for 'the other West African staples the comparative efficiency of 
peasant [small farmer] methods has not been seriously challenged' (Hancock, 1940, p. 200; see 
also Austin, 1996).  The main theme of Peter Bauer's (1948) famous study of the rubber industry 
is the greater efficiency of Southeast Asian smallholders than European plantations. 
3.3 Composition of colonial borrowing 
For the eight tropical countries to have received per capita foreign investment not too obviously 
at odds with their per capita exports, colonial governments would have had to borrow for social 
overhead projects including railways.  Fully 75% of pre-1914 British foreign investment was in 
public utilities, government securities and railways, and this same proportion of lending took the 
form of debentures and preference shares (Stone, 1999, p. 23-24, 31).  The lumpiness of social 
overhead capital dictated portfolio investment (Edelstein, 1994a, pp. 177-82).  By contrast, 
foreign investment in Southeast Asia was, in the paucity of portfolio and government borrowing, 
the polar opposite of the New World pattern.  In 1930 direct (as opposed to portfolio) 
investment, mainly in trading and finance, accounted between 78% and 96% of foreign capital 
in Southeast Asia with the exception of Thailand where the proportion was 57% (Callis, 1942, p. 
108).  Comparable figures are lacking for Ghana and Nigeria but in West Africa as a whole 
portfolio lending had more of a role than in Southeast Asia (Hopkins, 1973, pp. 191-92).  
3.4 Tax ratios and fiscal policy   18
In a pre-Second World War world where governments organized the bulk of overseas 
borrowing, foreign investment was restricted by low tax ratios in most of Southeast Asia and 
West Africa and by the determination of colonial governments to avoid deficits.  Table 2 shows 
tropical economy tax ratios in support of this argument.  In 1913 tropical ratios of typically 
around 5% to 7%, although low, were not entirely out of line with the about 10% in Western 
countries.  The big difference came in the interwar years when developed country tax ratios rose 
to 20% or more but ratios in tropical economies lagged behind.  Burma, where taxes reached 
16% of GDP, showed that the tropics could tax.  However, as much as half of Burmese revenue 
was transferred to the Imperial government in Delhi with little or no return benefit (Hlaing, 
1973).  Comparatively high Thailand tax ratios are also misleading in that a substantial share of 
government revenues went into the near obsessive accumulation of foreign reserves.  Tax ratios 
in Indonesia, roughly the same as Thailand's by the interwar years, are a better guide to 
government spending.  The colonial exception was Malaya.  Tax ratios there were already 
12.1% by 1913 and, if with the help of a 1930s fall in GDP, stood at over 15% in 1937.  
Revenue came disproportionately from the Federated Malay States (FMS) where the export 
sector of Peninsular Malaya's economy centred but in 1931 with just 1.7 million of Malaya's 4.3 
million inhabitants.  The combination of extremely low population and abundant resources also 
made the FMS, as Schwulst (1931, pp.43, 53, 58) observed, a 'special case' of quite high per 
capita government spending, although for Malaya as a whole this peculiarity moderated. 
  Lewis' (1978, p. 218) observation that before the First World War tropical governments 
could do all they wanted for around 5% of GDP does not hold for all countries in Table 2.  But it 
applies to the majority before the war.  Even afterwards colonial government horizons remained 
low.  Although an alternative source of tax revenue might have been tariffs, colonial 
governments, at least until the 1930s, tended to keep these to a minimum.  For the Philippines 
Hooley (2005, p. 472) emphasizes the absence of tariffs and that 'Government revenues during   19
the entire American period approximated 7% of GDP, which was little more than already 
achieved under the [pre-1898] Spanish regime'. 
  Four main considerations influenced the restrictive fiscal approach of colonial 
governments and with this limited capital imports from metropolitan countries.  First, a 
fundamental tenet of colonial policy was that government revenue from taxes and other sources 
had to cover recurrent expenditures (Edelstein, 1994b, p. 210).  These expenditures including 
administration, police, defence and pensions, and in which wages and salaries loomed large, 
took the bulk of available revenues (Schwulst, 1931, p. 53; Helleiner, 1966, pp.23, 233; 
Hopkins, 1973, p. 191).  Low taxation, often in deference to European merchant lobbies (Kay, 
1972, pp. 17-18, 26-28; Hlaing, 1973, pp. 4-5; Booth, 1998, p. 147), and high standing 
expenditure commitments left little room for additional spending and circumscribed debt service 
capacity. 
  The second and third reasons were closely linked and seem to have had much greater 
importance than any rate of return analysis in determining whether to undertake capital projects.  
One was that such capital spending as occurred had to be consistent with the usual aim of 
colonial governments to balance budgets over a short period of time and, if possible, run an 
overall surplus.  Over the period 1900 - 1939 all six Southeast Asian (but not the two West 
African) countries registered cumulative budget surpluses.  The other reason was that 
government revenue moved with the value of international trade — also its largest single source 
— and wide fluctuations in commodity prices, not just over a few months but years, encouraged 
caution.  With few exceptions orthodoxy prevailed.  In the inter-war depressions of 1920-22 and 
1930-32, only Malaya, Indonesia and Ghana (in 1920-22) found themselves with large fiscal 
deficits.  During 1930-32 three of the eight countries had healthy surpluses of revenue over 
expenditure and none ran a deficit bigger than 14% of revenue for the three years.  But narrowly   20
commodity-based export economies and an aim of limiting borrowing gave little scope for error 
to be sure of balancing budgets. 
  Fourth, after the turn of the century each of the eight tropical economies except 
Indochina operated a strict, or colonial, currency board system.  Under it the balance of 
payments almost entirely determined local money supply and this increased the risk for tropical 
governments of contracting fixed interest external debt if unwilling to countenance the counter 
measure of borrowing abroad.  At times of commodity price falls, without capital inflows to 
offset lower export revenue and a resulting balance-of-payments deficit, interest repayments on 
debt would have magnified the currency board system’s already considerable effect in forcing 
monetary-led deflation on tropical economies (Huff, 2003). 
3.5 Railways, infrastructure and colonial development 
Did colonial rule really contribute to limiting investment in social overhead projects and so also 
foreign capital inflows to Southeast Asia and West Africa?  To help answer this question, a 
counterfactual exists in those independent nations of Latin America which are directly 
comparable to Southeast Asia and West Africa in having strong links to the global market from 
the late nineteenth century onwards but different in having independent governments.  Capital 
exports for infrastructure meant, above all, finance for railway expansion.  Admittedly, 
differences in geography and ownership patterns make inexact any comparison of capital 
inflows to finance railways in the eight tropical countries and Latin America.  But a major 
divergence in rail density between the colonial and politically independent areas would suggest a 
significant difference in government's role in infrastructure provision. 
To test for such a difference Table 3 measures rail density as kilometers of track per 
100,000 population for the eight colonies and eight export-oriented Latin American countries.  
The latter include the mining region of the Andes (Chile, Bolivia and Peru), the tropical 
plantation economies of Central America (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and   21
the sugar economy of Cuba.  Data for four years between 1901 and 1938 for 16 countries (eight 
colonial and eight independent) yield 64 observations.  In all but one instance (Malaya and 
Honduras in 1913) the achievement of denser (and often substantially so) rail networks in Latin 
America than the eight colonies lends support to the argument that colonial governments may 
have fallen short in providing infrastructure. 
3.6 Education, human capital and colonial development 
In many New World countries, above all the United States, increased human capital through 
mass primary education, physical investment, including social overhead projects, and foreign 
capital inflows complemented one another.  Comparison with the United States as the leading 
New World economy and Japan as the leader in Asia shows just how badly the eight tropical 
economies lagged in the spread of primary education (table 4).  A Japanese government-directed 
'catch-up', and full enforcement by 1900 of four years of compulsory schooling, created in 1910 
a base of mass primary education similar to that in the United States and other rich countries 
(Japan, Ministry of Education, 1963, pp. 23-26, 160-61).  By contrast, in 1930 education in the 
eight tropical economies, the Philippines apart, had still to reach the Japanese level of 1882 and 
was a fraction of 1880s United States' schooling.  Comparison with the New World countries of 
Argentina and Brazil, both recipients of large inflows of unskilled, uneducated international 
migrants (Leff, 1982, vol. 1, pp. 19-20, 61; Bunge and Mata, 1931, pp. 152-59), narrows the 
Southeast Asian and African divergence in primary education but does not eliminate it. 
  In the tropical economies, the Philippines excepted, the most important reason for the 
absence of mass education was the failure of governments to make this a priority.  Educational 
provision was especially weak in colonial Africa where 'budgetary penury and the requirement 
of financial self-sufficiency' limited the expansion of education (Young, 1994, p. 168).  In 
Ghana in the 1930s, if numbers attending school increased at the same rate as between 1911 and 
1936, some 600 years would have had to elapse before schooling became available for all   22
children enumerated in the 1931 census.  Booth (1998) shows that throughout Indonesia the 
Dutch government spent far too little on education. 
  Lack of supply was not, however, the sole explanation for what appears to be 
education’s small contribution to enhancing productivity in the eight tropical economies.  In the 
Philippines, America's transplantation of its nineteenth-century educational experience and 
associated republican ideology resulted in primary schooling on a par with Argentina and a 1940 
literacy rate of 84%.  And yet, as Hooley (2005, p. 471) puzzles, educational advances 'seem to 
have had little impact on productivity.  The improvement in total factor productivity (TFP) 
during the colonial period was marginal at best'.  In the tropical economies the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between greater educational inputs and productivity gains awaited a 
shift in attitudes towards economic development to include industrialization and the role of 
government as an institution to promote it.  These changes came either only during the post-
World War II twilight of colonial rule or awaited political independence. 
3.7 Investment opportunities and capital market failure 
This section poses two further questions.  Were colonial governments really too conservative?  
And did the governments of Southeast Asia and West Africa in fact have to take the lead in 
social overhead investment for it to be undertaken?  These issues are considered in turn. 
It could be that little foreign investment went to the resource-rich tropics because few 
additional opportunities existed for the productive use of capital, foreign or domestic.  Was it 
perhaps a good thing that the fiscal conservatism of colonial governments limited capital 
projects?  Or, recalling that creditworthy governments could borrow at interest rates of only 
about 5%, might more development-oriented governments have identified social overhead 
projects that generated sufficient revenue to require, at most, no more than a small increase in 
the tax burden (Lewis, 1970, p. 36; Atkin, 1977, p. 145)?  A full answer awaits detailed research   23
but available evidence strongly indicates that had significantly more foreign capital flowed to the 
eight countries it could have been used productively. 
Tellingly, the evidence on colonial investment potential extends well beyond the test of 
railways.  Hooley (2005, pp. 472-73) summarizes this for the Philippines:  
fiscal revenues remained small and government expenditures for capital formation were 
severely constrained … It is truly remarkable how much the American administration 
was able to achieve with such limited resources.  Nevertheless, the fiscal constraint 
effectively prevented it from undertaking a more extensive program of capital formation 
that would have paid handsome economic returns, and would have vastly improved the 
prospects for Philippine economic development during the independence period that 
followed World War II. 
 
Areas identified as needing more spending included ports, irrigation, roads and public buildings. 
For West Africa, Hopkins (1973, pp. 190-91) observes that the influence of Gladstonian 
public finance was felt well into the twentieth century.  Before the Second World War public 
investment was 'very limited compared with what was required, what was to come in the future 
and what was already being invested in other parts of the world'.  It seems clear that in Ghana 
until at least the later 1920s 'the economy was constrained by lack of infrastructure facilities: a 
deep-sea harbour, urban water supplies and social overheads (particularly schools)' 
(Szereszewski, 1965, p. 110).  Few analysts of any of the eight countries would entirely disagree 
with the thrust of these remarks as applied to their particular colony before the Second World 
War, although variations occurred.  In British colonies (four of the eight countries) the pattern 
was, as Helleiner (1966, p. 300) describes for Nigeria, of governments 'content simply to 
maintain order while providing a minimum of infrastructure and research facilities'.  In its 
financial and developmental conservatism, Thailand was as British colonial as any of the four 
British colonies.  Ingram (1971, p. 212) concludes that the Thai government failed to furnish 
essential public works of railways, power, electricity and irrigation; educational provision was 
'seriously inadequate'.  In all these regards the government's 'conservative monetary and fiscal 
policies became significant'.   Feeny (1982, pp. 105-7) and Sompop (1989, pp. 176-78)   24
demonstrate, for irrigation and railways respectively, that more Thai government investment 
would have easily paid for itself. 
 By contrast with British colonial regimes, in Indochina the French willingly committed 
to a number of major infrastructure projects, especially when such spending could be expected 
to benefit interests in France (Callis, 1942, pp. 71-74).  So, too, was the Dutch administration in 
Indonesia more geared than British colonialism to infrastructure development, but only in Java 
and not the Outer Provinces.  There were many Outer Provinces areas that could have opened to 
export production if railways had been built (Booth, 1998, pp. 5, 151-54). 
The second question stems from the argument that because neither Southeast Asia nor West 
Africa had well organized, deep capital markets, market failure must, by definition, have existed.  
Governments would have to take the lead if the eight countries were to receive greater amounts 
of foreign capital for social overhead projects.  But is this true?  The example of Meiji Japan, 
which began the 1870s with a similar per capita income to most of the eight tropical economies, 
a currency system described as 'chaotic' (Bank of Japan, n. d., pp. 91-95) and no modern banks,  
shows how government could encourage financial development and effectively counter market 
failure.  But nothing similar was possible in colonial Southeast Asia or West Africa.  
Governments were strongly laissez faire in the area of finance and this effectively ruled out 
Japanese style state intervention to build national financial institutions.  In 1939 Southeast Asian 
and West African stock markets were still, at best, rudimentary (Huff, 2007).  For lumpy social 
overhead projects, all of the eight countries had to look to government investment or overseas 
investors and the latter, Edelstein (1982) shows, demanded the seal of government involvement. 
4.  Conclusion 
Institutional arrangements and geography have become central to recent thinking on 
development and historical economics, and analysis of foreign investment in the tropics shows 
why this should be so (see, for example, Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman,   25
2000; Acemoglu, et al., 2002; Rodrik, et al., 2004).  Rapid export expansion in regions of recent 
European settlement and in important parts of the eight tropical countries had in common the 
geography of a moving frontier.  In the New World migrant labour and foreign capital were 
drawn to this frontier as complements (Harley, 2000, p. 930; Clemens and Williamson, 2004, p. 
333).  But in the tropics migrants could be attracted to frontier areas for no more than a 
subsistence wage plus some mark up rather than a European standard of living as required in the 
New World.  An important reason why foreign capital did not flow to the eight tropical areas to 
seek cheap migrant labour was that this labour was so cheap as effectively to substitute for 
capital so long as natural resources were highly abundant and used in large quantities. 
  Governments in the tropics could have done more to mobilize natural resource rents 
through taxation and make use of the revenue to borrow abroad for infrastructure and to invest in 
education.  Where capital outlays like the Malayan railway were financed from current revenue, 
governments could instead have borrowed abroad.  A larger share of current revenue could then 
have gone towards education or other capital spending for which foreign loans were difficult, or 
impossible, to obtain.  Greater attention to education might, through more educated populations 
and increased human capital, have attracted higher foreign investment, as probably occurred in 
the New World.  But colonial rule generally proved incompatible with mass education.  In the 
eight tropical countries the prevailing institution of colonialism, aided by a favourable 
geography, worked against government borrowing.  More foreign capital would almost certainly 
have flowed to these tropical countries to develop infrastructure and lay developmental 
foundations, just as it did in the New World, if the attitude of their governments been different. 
  Between 1870 and 1939 the tropics received a gnat's share of global foreign investment.  
Contrary to New World experience, however, in the group of tropical countries analyzed in this 
article slight foreign investment reflected the very fact of an abundance of natural resources.  For 
social overhead projects local capital market failure left it up to colonial governments in the   26
eight countries to organize investment and foreign capital inflows.  But governments, too, 
largely failed colonial economic development in being overly bound by restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policies and by a determination to run Empires on the cheap. 
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Table 1 
New World, Asia and Africa exports and foreign investment per capita 1871-1938 
(1990 US$) 
 
(a) Exports per capita (annual averages) 
  1871/3 1900/2 1911/3 1925/7 1936/8 
Canada    230     641      605  1,116     831 
Argentina    260     621      851     666     431 
Australia    891   1,098
   1,249
  1,005
  1,084 
South Africa        377      699     449     554 
       
Indochina    —       37       46       51       41 
Outer Provinces (Indonesia)     35       79     146     176     118 
Malaya    471  1,071  1,064 1,319       868 
Philippines     27       61       79     101       87 
Thailand     12       50       61       88       54 
Burma     44     107     144     157     120 
       
Ghana     13       79     142     164     179 
Nigeria       3       12       26       31       24 
       
(b) Foreign investment per capita 
    1900 1913 1930 1938 
Canada     226   385   377   359
 
Argentina     290   266   140
   104 
Australia     308   275
   300
   229 
South Africa     157   202     145
 
       
Indochina          9
      8     11 
Indonesia (Java and Outer Provinces)        7    12     16     18
 
Malaya        58     61     50 
Philippines        10     14     13
 
Thailand         6       5      5 
       
Ghana        29
       15 




Notes: Panel (b).  Canada: 1938 figure refers to 1939; Argentina: 1930 figure refers to 1929; Australia: 1913 figure 
refers to 1914, and 1930 figure refers to 1929; South Africa: 1938 figure refers to 1935; Indochina: 1913 figure 
refers to 1914; Outer Provinces (Indonesia): foreign investment data refers to all of Indonesia.  Investment in the 
Outer Provinces was a small proportion of these totals; 1913 figure refers to 1914, and 1938 figure refers to 1937; 
Malaya: 1913 figure refers to 1914, 1930 figure refers to 1929, and 1938 figure refers to 1937; Philippines: 1913 
figure refers to 1914, and 1938 figure refers to 1935; Thailand: 1913 figure refers to 1914, and 1930 figure refers to 
1929; Ghana: 1913 figure refers to 1911; Nigeria: Statistics are for the colony only to 1892 and Southern Nigeria 
only for 1892-1899.  The 1938 figure refers to 1935.   33
 Table 2 
Southeast Asia and West Africa tax ratios, 1913-1938 
(government revenue as a % of GDP) 
 
  1913 1929 1937 
Indochina     1.6    1.6    1.4 
Indonesia     6.1   11.1    9.8 
Malaya   12.1    10.9   15.5 
Philippines    7.0   7.0     7.0 
Thailand    9.6     9.1    12.2 
Burma  15.7   11.6    14.2 
Ghana    4.2
     7.0  - 
 
Sources: Appendix. 
Notes: (1) Indochina refers to Vietnam only and figures include central government revenues and revenues of local 
budgets.  The figures omit an estimate of corvée labour, which was not insignificant.  (2) For 1913 Malaya includes 
the Straits Settlements (SS), Federated Malay States (FMS) only and for later dates also the Unfederated Malay 
States (UMS).  For this last, revenue was mainly from Johore and not large in 1913 since that state was still little 
developed before the First World War.  In 1929 UMS revenue was 24.6% of SS and FMS revenue and a similar 









  1901  1913 1929 1938 
Burma     14.4    20.6      21.2    19.7 
Indochina       1.6    11.8    11.2    14.7 
Thailand      2.5    11.6    24.6    21.4 
Malaya    20.9    46.6    38.4    34.4 
Indonesia    10.1    12.8    12.1    10.3 
Philippines      2.6    12.4    9.6     8.5 
Ghana      3.4    16.7    25.5    21.4 
Nigeria      1.5     9.6    14.4    13.4 
Chile 145.4  232.9 196.6 178.5 
Bolivia    54.5    64.0    89.1    86.3 
Peru    58.3    76.8    61.4    45.5 
Costa Rica  121.1  162.5 136.0 112.7 
Guatemala    70.3    84.7    67.9    56.1 
Honduras    22.0    41.6  157.2  119.6 
Nicaragua    51.8    56.3     48.2     46.8 
Cuba 116.7  157.6 138.3 117.2 
 
Sources and Notes:  Mitchell, 2003b; Saito and Lee, 1999, p. 167.  For Malaya statistics exclude Johore and 
Singapore until 1911.  The 1911 figure of 1,127 km includes Johore and Singapore.  For 1940 2,115 km is the length 
of track and 1,719 the length of open line.   34
 
Table 4 
Southeast Asia, West Africa and comparative primary school enrollment rates, 1870-1939 
(per 10,000 population) 
 
  1870 1882 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1939
Burma       206  316
Indochina       190  260
Thailand     9 179  552  939
Malaya         548
Indonesia     57 62 96 161  267  338
Philippines     188 970 1038  936  1267
Ghana     47 71 166  169  217
Nigeria     27 72  246  501
Brazil   207 218 258 271 455 618 854
Argentina   511 709 808 944 1356  1172  1417
Japan   722 772 984 1240 1508  1550  1695
United States  1702  1908 1985 1969 1828    
 
Notes and Sources: Easterlin, 1981, pp. 18-19; Indochina, 1943-46, p. 274; Furnivall, 1943, p. 111; Kay, 1972, pp. 






Data sources for the tables 
 
Exports: Burma: Shein, 1964, pp. 263-64; Burma, 1912-13 - 1920-21; Andrus, 1948, p. 183.  Indochina: Frézouls, 
1908, p. 274; Indochina, 1908, pp. 407, 448-9; Arnaud, 1920, p. 267; Leurence, 1925, p. 143; Indochina, 1927-1948, 
issue for 1942-44, p. 290; Stover, 1970, p. 48.  Thailand: Ingram, 1971, pp. 333-34.  Malaya: Chiang, 1978, pp. 
174-75; Malaya, 1921-1928; Malaya, 1930-1937; Malaya, 1941.  Indonesia: Korthals Altes, 1991, pp. 50-56, 69-
75. Philippines: Philippines, 1905, vol. 4, pp. 564-5; Philippines, 1918-1938, issues 1918, p. 32, 1920, p. 125; 
Philippines, 1938, p. 324; Philippines, 1940, 1946, issue 1940, p. 415; Ghana: Mitchell, 2003a, p. 519 (until 1899); 
Kay, 1972, p. 325 (from 1900).  For 1871/73 figure refers to exports for 1872 and 1873 only.  Population is 
estimated from an 1891 figure assuming a growth rate of 0.65% per annum.  Nigeria: Mitchell, 2003a, p. 520 (until 
1899); Helleiner, 1966, pp. 492-93 (from 1900).   The 1871/73 figure is estimated using recorded export figures and 
assuming 1872-1904 population growth of 0.65% per annum.  Statistics are for the colony only to 1892 and 
Southern Nigeria only for 1892-1899. Argentina: Ferns, 1960, pp. 492-93 for trade 1870-1910; Diaz-Alejandro, 
1970, pp. 2, 461, 475-76, 484; Australia: Butlin, 1962, pp. 410-11, 436-37, 441, 443, 470.  Exports include gold 
until 1938 and exclude gold thereafter.  In the three years 1936-1938 gold exports averaged £12.9m. Beginning in 
1914/15 data are for fiscal years. Canada: Urquhart and Buckley, 1965, pp. 173, 183.  Data are for calendar years 
after 1919, fiscal years ending 31 March of the year given from 1908-1919 and for fiscal years ending 30 June of the 
year given for 1868-1906.  The total for 1907 is for the 9 months ending 31 March 1907. Exports include gold.  
South Africa: Mitchell, 2003a, p. 521 (1902-1907) and includes Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange Free State and 
Transvaal; Katzen, 1964, pp. 46, 60-61, 71(from 1908).  For 1900/02 export figures are for 1902 and 1903 and 
population for 1904.  Exports from South Africa include gold.   
 
Population: Burma: Figures for Lower Burma refer to the 1872 census area.  The figure for 1938 refers to 1941.  
Burma (1933), p. 8; Hlaing, 1964a, p. 13.  Indochina: Figures for 1880 and 1911 are from Brocheux and Hémery, 
who point out that they are orders of magnitude.  The figure for 1911 refers to 1913 and that for 1938 refers to 1936.  
Brocheux and Hémery, 1995, p. 248; Indochina, 1927-1948, issue 1943-1946, p. 271.  Population figures for 
Cochinchina refer for 1881 to 1880, for 1901 to 1900 and for 1938 to 1936.  Figures for 1880 and 1900 are from 
Sansom, 1970, pp. 259, 261; 1910: Coquerel, 1911, p. 225; 1921 and 1931: Indochina, 1927-1948, issues 1923-  35
1929, p. 61; 1931-32, p. 53, 1943-1946, p. 271. Thailand:  For 1881-1901 figures are from Skinner and refer to 
1880, 1890 and 1900. Skinner, 1957, p. 79.  Subsequent figures are from Kingdom of Siam, 1920-1939-40, issues 
1937-38 and 1939-40, p. 46 and refer to the census returns for 1919, 1929 and 1937 Malaya: The 1881 is population 
is estimated by assuming that population grew at the same rate as in 1891-1901.  For 1891 and 1901 figures are 
estimated for the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) only.  Estimation is on the basis of 1911 census figure of a UMS 
population of 899,968 persons and backward extrapolation assuming that during both decades the population grew at 
0.65 per cent per annum.  A basis for this assumed rate of UMS population growth is Dodge, 1980, pp. 457-74.  
Data for 1891-1911 is from Federated Malay States, 1911, pp.18, 95; Malaya, 1921, p. 18.  For 1921 onwards data is 
from Malaya, 1949,  p. 39.  The 1938 population figure is an estimate and assumes proportional population growth 
between 1931 and the 1947 census figure of 5,848,910 persons.  Indonesia:  The figure for 1881 refers to 1880.  
Indonesia, 1947, p. 5.  Figures for 1901, 1921 and 1931 refer to 1905, 1920 and 1930.  Boomgaard and Gooszen, 
1991, pp. 117-21, 133-37, 224-30.  Philippines: For 1881 the figure refers to 1877.  It is the census figure for that 
year for civilized people (5.567m) plus the 1903 census figure for ‘wild people’ transformed into an estimate for 
1877 under the assumption of population growth of 0.60% per annum. Philippines, 1905, vol. 2, pp.19, 123.  The 
1901 figure is for 1903 and from the census for that year. Philippines, 1905, p. 123.  The 1921 figure refers to 1918 
and is the census figure.  Philippines, 1921, vol. 2, p. 19.  The figure for 1931 is an estimate from Philippines, 1940, 
1946, issue 1940,  p. 24.  For 1931 the figure refers to 1930. The figure for 1938 is for the census taken of 1 January 
1939 and is from Philippines, 1939, p. 3. Ghana:  Mitchell, 2003a, p. 3; Kay, 1972 p. 310. Nigeria: Helleiner, 1966, 
p. 429.     Argentina: Diaz-Alejandro, 1970, p. 421; Australia: Mitchell, 2003a, pp. 64-65. Canada: Urquhart and 
Buckley, 1965, pp. 14-16. South Africa:  Mitchell, 2003a, pp. 5, 49. 
 
Foreign Investment: Twomey (2000). 
 
Revenue and expenditure: Burma: Shein, Thant and Sein, 1969,  pp. 25-26; Shein, 1964, pp. 273-74; Hlaing, 1973, 
p. 5 (for 1937-38 only).  Thailand:  Birnberg and Resnick, 1975, p. 316; Wilson, 1983,  pp.242-49.  Malaya: Straits 
Settlements, 1903-1938, issues 1903 , p. 589, 1904, p. 189, 1909, p. 439,  1911, pp. 459-60, 1937, I pp. 1017, 1019, 
1938, II, pp. 248-49; Straits Settlements, 1934, p. 20; Federated Malay States, 1929, p. 223; Fermor, 1939, p. 88; 
Emerson, 1937, pp. 187, 196, 300; FMS, 1939, p. 1. Indochina:  Bassino, 2000, pp. 287-88. Indonesia: Creutzberg, 
1976, pp. 59, 64-67.  Figures are estimated actual revenue and expediture in Indonesia as opposed to revenue and 
expenditure relating to Indonesia but in the Netherlands. Philippines: All figures are taken for the general estimate 
by Hooley, 2005, p. 472.  For revenue figures see Birnberg and Resnick, 1975, p. 307. Ghana: Kay, 1972, pp. 344-
45. 
 
Gross Domestic Product: Burma: Hlaing, 1964b, p. 143.  Figures are for Net National Product.  For 1913 the figure 
is for 1911/12 and for 1929 it is for 1926/27. Thailand: van der Eng, private communication, recalculation and 
extension of GDP figures in Sompop, 1989, p. 251. Malaya: Nazrin, 2002, p. 41.  These estimates are in current 
prices but are for Peninsular Malaya and exclude Singapore.  GDP to include Singapore is estimated by assuming 
that Singapore's GDP was 39.6% of Peninsular Malaya's (the proportion in 1956).  GDP for Singapore in 1956 is 
from Oshima, 1967, p. 49, and for Peninsular Malaya from Lim, 1967, p. 317. Indochina: Jean-Pascal Bassino,  
private communication, 1 October 2004. Indonesia:  van der Eng, 2002, pp. 171-72 and using the reflator  provided 
by  van der Eng. Philippines: For GDP figures in 1985 prices,  see Hooley, 2005 , pp. 480-81. Ghana: 
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